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There are a number of assertions in Mr. Easton's review' of my
book on anti-dumping policy2 which could, I believe, be misleading
to readers and which, therefore, merit further comment.
Most importantly, Mr. Easton takes me to task for concluding
that predatory pricing rather than dumping may be a problem in
international trade, and then offers the suggestion that I should
"prepare a sequel volume demonstrating, within the context of con-
sumer welfare, that predation is not a serious international trade
problem either."3 To say the least, I find this a surprising criticism
as one of the main conclusions of my study is that "predatory pric-
ing in international trade cannot properly be regarded as a real-
world problem demanding remedial legislation."' This view is sup-
ported by an extensive theoretical discussion of pricing behaviour
in both the domestic and international contexts, drawing also on
the mass of documentation on individual anti-dumping investiga-
tions that has accumulated since the Second World War. What
emerges from this discussion is that, whereas anti-dumping legisla-
tion has its origins in the alleged threat or predatory dumping,
attempted predation can seldom if ever represent rational com-
mercial behaviour for which reason, presumably, there are few in-
stances of predatory pricing in domestic markets and still fewer
in international trade. Mr. Easton therefore attributes to me a con-
clusion which is the direct opposite of the one at which I arrive.
Mr. Easton also objects to my using a welfare economics "frame
of reference"5 for assessing the legitimacy of anti-dumping actions.
I do not know whether he has in mind some other, more appropriate
economics frame of reference or whether he believes that anti-
dumping laws should not be subject to any form of economic ap-
praisal. In any event, Mr. Easton's further comment that a welfare
economics approach preordains an adverse conclusion about the
effects of anti-dumping action is directly contradicted by his own
argument in support of such action: that dumping, by providing
temporarily cheap imports, confers transient benefits on consumers
that are more than offset by the resulting disruption to domestic
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production. This is indeed a version of Jacob Viner's classic case
against dumping,6 which my study seeks to challenge.
Mr. Easton complains that I criticise the effects of anti-dumping
actions "from the perspective of abstract economic principles"7
which "may lead to naive conclusions."8 However, a large part of
my study is devoted to a critical examination of the operation of
anti-dumping laws in practice, based on the entire post World War
Two case history of anti-dumping investigations in North America
and Europe. The perverse effects of anti-dumping action also are
illustrated by detailed consideration of pricing behaviour in the
United States, Europen and Japanese steel industries. This analysis
indicates that anti-dumping laws and procedures have been adapted
to reconcile cartelised domestic steel pricing with unregulated com-
petition in international steel markets. Here the conventional
justification for anti-dumping action, prevention of predatory
behaviour aimed ultimately at monopolistic pricing, has been turned
on its head. It is further suggested that this overtly anti-competitive
use of anti-dumping laws may have had the effect of increasing
unemployment in both the steel and steel-using industries. Mr.
Easton does not address these arguments, which also have a wider
application outside the steel sector.
Finally, Mr. Easton's review fails to address my central argu-
ment for reform: that anti-dumping laws are being used as a pro-
tectionist safety valve, a purpose for which they are neither
designed nor intended and which would be fulfilled much better
(if fulfilled it must be) by a reformed and purpose-built GATT Ar-
ticle XIX safeguard provision.
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